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Abstract 
 
  With the development of big data mining and location-based services (LBS), the 
convenience in the life of consumers has been enhanced owing to intelligent navigation and 
recommendation services such as Amazon, Netflix, and Google Maps. Not only do these 
servers know the locations and needs of users, but they also provide various services 
corresponding to these locations and requirements. Usually, the users are sensitive to disclose 
their personal information; there are unavoidable security concerns because confidential 
information such as the users’ financial or health status, sexual orientation, and religious 
preferences can be easily misused by malicious third parties. The mainstream solution to this 
problem is employing the privacy k-NN search techniques such as k-anonymous and privacy 
information retrieval (PIR). However, there are two major bottlenecks corresponding to the 
privacy k-NN search technique. One is that it only provides the nearest points of interest (POI) 
to the users without any recommendations based on the users’ history behavior. This limited 
service eventually results in a situation in which no user would prefer to continue using it. The 
other is that only the users hold the privacy key in privacy k-NN search’s scenario; thus, the 
service providers cannot obtain any user information to analyze which is the service providers’ 
major source of profit. To this end, we propose two solutions that could benefit both consumers 
and service providers. To solve the first problem, the proposed protocol provides 
recommendation services without revealing the users’ information such as location and POI 
requirement to the service provider, based on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). 
Specifically, the proposed protocol can enable service providers to generate location-based 
recommendations by combining the encrypted user’s information from the user side and other 
users’ preferences stored in an encrypted database, which can be updated. For the second 
problem, a privacy service provider (PSP) was designed to generate and hold the privacy key. 
Thus, service providers can homomorphically compute aggregate information concerning user 
behavior patterns, and send the encrypted results to PSP to ensure decryption, while 
maintaining the privacy of individual users. Compared with the previous studies that only 
concentrated on the private k-NN search, the novelty of the proposed protocol is that the design 
of a commercially valuable privacy recommendation system mechanism on LBS, which can 
be applied practically. 
 
Keywords --- PPDM, private preserving data mining, LBS, location based 
service 
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1. Introduction 
     Location-based services (LBS) and their recommendation systems based on big data mining 
technology provide various intelligent services to the consumers. The services recommend 
products, entertainments, news, or POIs based on the consumers’ purchasing and search history 
habits. A user can receive a more accurate recommendation if a larger amount of user 
information is accessible to the service providers. However, the consumers’ privacy can be 
threatened if the service providers integrate and analyze the enormous data that they hold. 
There is a possibility that the service providers could control and exploit highly sensitive 
personal information pertaining to users’ sexual orientation, religious views, ethnicity, political 
views, and personal traits, which could lead to critical social problems in the near future. Even 
though governments have introduced the data privacy policy to regulate the way of collecting 
and using data, and the service providers provide assurance to protect users’ personal 
information from being revealed, there is still an inherent risk for deliberate or inadvertent 
misuse; a case in point is the Facebook data privacy scandal that happened in April 2018 and 
led to the shutdown of Cambridge Analytica. In addition, if the servers are attacked by 
malicious third parties, there is a high risk for the consumers’ personal information to be 
disclosed, similar to in the worldwide ransomware attack named WannaCry, which happened 
in May 2017 and targeted computers running the Microsoft Windows operating system. The 
ransomware encrypted the important files of the user and demanded payments to recover these 
files.  
     The conventional encryption algorithms such as AES and DES can protect data effectively, 
although their limitation is that the ciphertexts must be decrypted before they can be operated 
upon.  
     The lattice-based fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme [1], which was introduced 
by Craig Gentry in 2009 appears to be a vital key to solving the security problem in the cloud 
field, because it supports arbitrary functions, and a number of operations can be performed on 
the ciphertexts stored in the cloud without decryption. 
     Before the homomorphic encryption was introduced, location privacy and privacy-
preserving recommendations were two isolated fields because of the different security 
techniques involved. However, the lattice-based FHE can be applied in both fields. Therefore, 
this study attempts to design a mechanism that can combine the location privacy and privacy-
preserving recommendation to ensure higher practical and commercial value for the LBS 
privacy. 
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1.1 Organization 
     The remaining paper is divided into six sections. In Section 2, the concepts of fully 
homomorphic encryption, the Hilbert curve, and the collaborative filtering recommender based 
on the co-occurrence matrix are explained. In Section 3, the related works based on both spatial 
transformations and cryptographic methods are discussed. In Section 4, the proposed model, 
and the phases from initialization to recommendation are described. In Section 5, the 
performance and evaluation of the proposed model are described. The conclusions are 
presented in Section 6. 
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2. Background 
2.1 Notations 
      Table 1 describes notations referred to our protocols 
2.2 Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) 
       FHE, which can perform arbitrary functions and a number of operations over the encrypted 
data, was first highlighted by Rivest et al. [2], and has been known to be applied in a 
considerable number of applications such as E-health, cloud computing and LBS.  
       In 2009, Craig Gentry theoretically demonstrated the possibility of FHE construction 
based on ideal lattices [3]. To ensure security, noise is added to the ciphertexts. The noise keeps 
increasing after the homomorphic operations are applied. If the noise size exceeds the limit 
value, decryption errors could occur. Therefore, Gentry used the bootstrapping technique, 
which can refresh the ciphertexts by running the decryption function homomorphically to 
overcome the growth of noise. 
      In 2012, Brakerski, Gentry, and Vaikuntanathan introduced the BGV scheme [4], which 
overcomes the growth of noise by using key switching and the modulus switching technique 
that uses bootstrapping as an optimization. The key switching technology is used to convert 
TABLE 1  
NOTATIONS 
Notation Description 
Z Integer ring 
Fm(x) m-th cyclotomic polynomial 
R Polynomial quotient ring R: = Z[x]/ Fm(x) 
C Arithmetic circuit 
Su,j Preference of user u for item j 
Sim(i,j) Similarity between items i and j 
N(i) Number of users who like item i 
N Size of the co-occurrence matrix 
m Ring modulus  
l Number of slots in a single cipher text 
L Number of ciphertext modules 
l Security Level 
○+  Addition over ciphertexts 
U Multiplication over ciphertexts 
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the expanded ciphertexts to fresh ciphertexts, and the modulus switching technology is used to 
reduce the noise. In addition, among quite a few works [5–9], the BGV scheme is one of the 
most efficient FHE schemes involving the modulus and key switching techniques. In [5], a 
small overhead characteristic of the BGV scheme is reported. Brakerski [6] also suggested that 
the BGV scheme improved the defect of the Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan scheme [10], 
wherein the scheme requires a large modulus to perform decryption owing to the large noise 
growth because the modulus switching of BGV scales down the ciphertexts vector after every 
multiplication. In [5][7], the authors mentioned that more efficient FHE schemes can be 
achieved by combining SIMD operations and the BGV scheme. 
      In [10], Smart and Vercauteren introduced a method to decompose the size of ciphertext 
by packing based on the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT), which enables single-instruction-
multiple-data (SIMD) operations to be applied on homomorphic encryption.  
      IBM Research released the open source of the homomorphic encryption library HElib [11], 
which implements ring-learning with errors (R-LWE) based on the BGV scheme. It also 
supports Smart–Vercauteren ciphertexts packing, and contains four key algorithms: key 
generation (keyGen), encryption (Enc), decryption (Dec), and ciphertext calculation evaluation 
(evk,C,c1,...,ct ). The specific algorithms are as follows:      Set Rq=Zq[x]/(Fm(x)), where q is 
a prime and Fm(x) is the m-th cyclotomic polynomial. When m is the prime, F!(x) =∑ 𝑥(!)*(+, . When m is the multiple of two, F!(x) = 𝑥-. + 1 
1. Setup: Setup(1l,1L) 
Given the security parameter l and the circuit depth L as input.  
2. Key generation: sk = (1,s) = (1,s0 + s1X + s2X2 + … sN-1XN-1) Îℝ23 , sÎ{0,±1}  
                            pk = (a0 , a1) = ( [-(as + te)]q , a) Îℝ23 , e is the small error and a is 
uniformly sampled from Rq 
3. Encryption:    c ¬ Enc(m , pk) 
                         c = (c0 , c1) = (a0v + te0 + m, a1v + te1) Îℝ23  where v Î R is a randomly 
chosen polynomial with coefficients in {0, ±1} and e0, e1 are small errors 
4. Decryption:    m ¬ Dec(c , sk)  
                         c	∙	sk = c0 + c1s  
                                  = (a0 + a1s) v + te0 + te1s + m  
= t (-ev + e0 + e1s) + m (mod q) 
           After performing modulo t, the correct plaintext can be recovered. 
 
5. Addition:  
m1+m2¬ Dec(Enc(m1)○+  Enc(m2)) 
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6. Multiplication:  
m1m2 ¬ Dec(Enc(m1)U Enc(m2)) 
 
FHE scheme is known to be applied in a considerable number of applications such as E-
health, Cloud Computing and Location-Based Service. 
 
2.3 Hilbert Curve 
The Hilbert Space-Filling curve [12] which is a continuous fractal space-filling curve first 
described by the German mathematician David Hilbert in 1891. There are two reasons why we 
adopted the Hilbert Curve among so many curves. One is the capability of partially retaining 
the neighboring adjacency of the original data. [13] [14] shows the Hilbert curves can achieve 
the best clustering properties. The other is the it’s dimensionality reduction characteristic that 
it can traverse through all cells in the 2-D space and transform them to 1-D data structure which 
enables database to store and retrieve the POI’s location information in a more effective way.  
The basic idea of applying Hilbert curve for POI search in the proposed method is based on 
the works of [15–17]. Ali et al. [15] proposed a fundamental approach that applies Hilbert 
curves as efficient one-way transformations to preserve the users’ location privacy by encoding 
the space of all objects and answering the query blindly in the encoding space. In [16], Lien at 
al. introduced the secret circular shift protocol (SCSP) for k-NN search based on the Hilbert 
curve and a public key homomorphic cryptosystem. Utsunomiya at el. [17] proposed a 
lightweight private circular query protocol on the basis of SCSP.   
Figure 1 shows an example of the structure of the combination of Hilbert curve and LBS. 
Figure 1(a) shows a Hilbert curve over the map, Fig. 1(b) shows the POI look-up table stored 
on the user side, and Fig. 1(c) shows the POI Info table stored on the server side. The look-up 
table saves the POI’s cell number and the relationship between the POI’s cell number and block 
number, whereas the POI Info table saves the information of the POI and the relationship 
between the POI and block number. In addition, owing to the proposed encrypted database 
structure, which is introduced in Section 4, we divide the table into a set of blocks.  
A user is located in cell number 8 which belongs to Block 1 according to the look-up table 
in Fig. 1(a), and wishes to request nearby POIs from the server. Thus, the endpoint of the user 
informs the user’s current block number 1 to the LBS server.  After the server receives the 
block number, it can return POIs corresponding to block 1, i.e., p1, p2, p3, to the user’s 
endpoint.  
     However, the user’s location and requests are sensitive, thus, sending such information in 
plaintext might threaten users’ privacy. 
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          Fig.1.  Example of the structure of combination between Hilbert Curve and Location-Based Service 
 
2.4 Collaborative Filtering Recommender Based on Co-occurrence 
Matrix [18][19] 
      There are two well-known algorithms in the field of collaborative filtering filed: user-based 
and item-based. In this study, item-based collaborative filtering (CF) recommender is applied 
in our proposed protocol for two reasons:  
1. Similarity between items is more stable than that between users. 
2. Our task is to calculate the similarity between items and provide recommendations. 
      E-commerce websites such as Amazon or subscription services such as Netflix usually 
provide users recommendations such as “The customer who bought A also bought B” or “The 
customer who watched A also watched B.” We can summarize the metric from these sentences 
as follow: 
                                          𝑠𝑖𝑚(𝑖, 𝑗) = |=(>)∩=(@)|=(>)                     (1) 
 |𝑁(B) ∩ 𝑁(()| denotes the number of users who like both item i and item j.  𝑁(B) denotes the 
number of users who like item i. The software library HElib that implements homomorphic 
encryption cannot directly support division or floats at the present time because of technical 
difficulty; thus, we cannot apply	𝑠𝑖𝑚(𝑖, 𝑗) = |=(>)∩=(@)|=(>)  when both |𝑁(B) ∩ 𝑁(()| and 𝑁(B)  are 
encrypted. Instead, we adopt 	𝑠𝑖𝑚(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝐶[B][(] = |𝑁(B) ∩ 𝑁(()| in the recommendation phrase. 
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The calculation of 
|=(>)∩=(@)|=(>)  is implemented after the recommended result is decrypted by the 
decryption server. We will provide a detailed explanation of this process in Section 3. 
There are two steps to generate a co-occurrence matrix in the ItemCF algorithm. 
1. Create a user-item inversion list 
2. Traverse the inversion list. If item i and item j are in the inversion list of the same user, 
then 𝐶[B][(](𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) in the co-occurrence matrix C will be incremented by 1. Furthermore, every 
time item i appears, 𝐶[B][(](𝑖 = 𝑗) is incremented by 1 simultaneously. 
      An example is shown in Fig.2:    
 
 
                             
      As for the generation of recommended results, the co-occurrence matrix will be multiplied 
by the user’s preference array. 
      The example is shown below (Fig.3): 
                         
                Fig.3 Generation of recommendation result  
Fig.2 The deform of co-occurrence matrix 
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3. Related Work 
  This section discusses the related works on privacy-preserving on LBS; such works are 
divided into two categories. One category is based on spatial transformation that solves the 
private k-NN search on LBS by using cloaking area and k-anonymous techniques. The other 
category is based on cryptography, which not only provides a higher security level on the 
private k-NN search but also privacy-preserving recommendation by FHE. 
3.1 LBS based on Spatial Transformations 
 To protect the user’s location data from being disclosed to the server, some existing methods 
perturb the real data by adding redundant data. For instance, the methods generate a few 
random fake locations and send redundant queries to the LBS server to hide the real location.  
   Gruteser et al. introduced k-anonymous ideas into the field of LBS privacy protection in 2003 
[20], which adopts spatial and temporal cloaking. The definition of k-anonymous is the a 
querying user cannot be distinguished from at least k-1 users who also send queries to the 
server, where k is customized by the user. To achieve this principle, a trusted third party (TTP) 
is employed. Fig.4, based on [20], shows the structure that includes the anonymizer-trusted 
third party:    
                         
  
 
The existing methods have several drawbacks: 
1. Weak in correlation attacks:  
     Assume a target user continuously sending requirements while he/she is moving. According 
to the existing methods, the TTP will generate a set of cloaking regions CRi that all contain 
user u. Malicious third parties can narrow down the size of the cloak region by intersecting all 
Fig.4 The model of Private-Preserving Recommendation on LBS (based on [20]) 
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the continuous CRi generated by the user. Therefore, the probability of identifying the querying 
user becomes extremely high. 
2. Single point of attack: 
Another drawback of the existing method is that TTP will obtain the single point of attack. 
This means if TTP is invaded by a malicious third party, then the entire security system will 
disintegrate. 
3. Hard to construct: 
     In many methods that contains TTP, a considerable number of users need to subscribe to 
the service and send their locations to the TTP continuously; otherwise, cloaking areas with k-
anonymous cannot be constructed.  
3.2 LBS based on Cryptographic methods 
a. Private Information Retrieval (PIR) 
      In order to improve security and protect against correlation attacks, Ghinita et al. proposed 
a higher security method called private information retrieval (PIR) [19] to address the privacy 
protection problem on LBS in 2008. It allows users to retrieve the POI privately from the 
database without informing the server what POI the user has requested based on quadratic 
residuosity assumption (QRA). It also abolishes the TTP structure to protect against single 
point attack. Another cryptographic method to solve the private nearest-neighbor search is 
homomorphic encryption. A private circular query protocol (PCQP) proposed by Lien et al. 
[15] and a lightweight protocol proposed by Utsunomiya [16] are state-of-the-art protocols for 
privacy-preserving k-NN search based on HE and Hilbert curve.   
All these existing works described above have a major disadvantage: the service is limited 
because they only provide privacy k-NN search without privacy-preserving recommendation. 
The consumers not only want to know which POI is the nearest to them but also which POI is 
the best among the POIs available near them. 
b. Privacy-preserving recommendation 
    Homomorphic encryption provides an easier and more flexible way to solve the privacy-
preserving recommendation because it can process calculations and analyses over the 
ciphertexts. Badsha et al. [22] introduced privacy-preserving item-based CF based on the 
ElGamal cryptosystem in 2016. One year later, Badsha et al. [23] introduced a protocol that 
protects the privacy of user’s online services by performing the BGN scheme. 
      However, there is no specialized privacy-preserving mechanism for a location-aware 
recommender system. The technical difficulty faced by the system is that it not only needs to 
provide recommendations over encrypted history records but also needs to deal with the 
encrypted real-time location data created by users 
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4. Proposed Model 
      There exist two problems in previous privacy k-NN search techniques used for POI 
searching. One is that it only returns the nearest POIs to the user without computing the 
similarity between the POIs near the user to generate the recommendations. The other is that 
service providers cannot obtain any user behavior statistics to make a profit because only users 
hold the privacy key in privacy k-NN search.                     
  To solve the first problem, we designed privacy-preserving recommendation on LBS Server 
(PPRS) in the proposed model to generate recommendation services over an encrypted 
database (ED) that can be updated.  
  To solve the second problem, we designed a privacy service provider (PSP) to generate and 
hold the privacy key. Service providers can perform computations of user behavior patterns 
over ED homomorphically and send the encrypted results to the PSP for decryption. This 
design makes it possible to analyze aggregate information about user behavior patterns while 
maintaining the privacy of individual users. 
 
 
 
4.1 Structure 
 The structure of the proposed model is shown in Fig.5; it includes three main parts: PSP, 
PPRS, and ED. The overview of the process is described below.  
      Target users send their encrypted location and POI requests to the PPRS (Step 1). The 
PPRS computes the encrypted recommendation list and sends it to the PSP to decrypt (Step 2). 
Fig.5 The model of Privacy-preserving recommendation on LBS  
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After decryption, the PSP transforms the recommendation lists into plaintext and sends them 
to the users through an encrypted channel and sends them to the users (Step 3). The users 
choose the POI in which they are interested from the recommendation list (Step 4). Then, they 
encrypt the result and send them to the ED through the PPRS (Step 5 and 6) for further 
recommendation on the PPRS. 
4.1.1 Privacy Service Provider(PSP):  
      The PSP has two main tasks: generate a set of public and private keys and decryption. It 
needs to decrypt two types of data from the PPRS: recommendation result and aggregate 
information about user behavior patterns. In addition, the recommendation result in plaintext 
is sent to the target user through an encrypted channel. 
4.1.2 Privacy-Preserving Recommendation on LBS Server (PPRS): 
 
      PPRS is the main part in the proposed model and performs two tasks. The first task involves 
receiving both the encrypted POI requests and the selection matrix corresponding to the user’s 
location from the user. The second task involves generating the recommendation list based on 
four factors: POI requests, selection matrix, Co-occurrence Matrix, and User History Behavior 
Matrix. (Fig.6) 
 
      It also takes responsibility for calculating the aggregate information about user behavior 
patterns over encrypted database. 
 
4.1.3 Encrypted Database (ED): 
ED stores two kinds of matrixes encrypted by FHE, one is the co-occurrence matrix of POI 
(Fig.7) and the other is users’ history behavior matrix (Fig.8), where e(•) represents the 
encrypted data. The novelty of this encrypted database is that it can be updated so that it can 
provide the recommendation by lasted data. 
Fig.6 Generation of the recommendation list   
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4.1.3.1 Co-occurrence Matrix of POI:  
 As shown in Fig.7, the co-occurrence matrix records the number of times each pair of items 
appears together in the user-item inversion list. The sequence of items is the same as that in the 
POI-table generated by the Hilbert Curve according to the map so that users can locate the 
exact small square corresponding to their location secretly. The co-occurrence matrix of POI 
is divided into fixed-length squares. The length can be customized by the users; the value 
depends on the security level or the desired recommendation range of the users. 
 
4.1.3.2 User Behavior History Matrix:  
 As shown in Fig.8, the user behavior history matrix is the user-item inversion list where (1) 
denotes that users like the item (POI) while (0) denotes that users do not like. 
4.2 Process 
     The processes of the proposed model are described in this subsection. 
4.2.1 Initialization Phase 
The main task during the initialization phase is to create an initial item-item co-occurrence 
matrix to provide recommendations. All the initial users generate their personal co-occurrence 
matrices that contain information of POIs in which the users are interested. Then, the users 
encrypt them with the public key that is sent from the PSP and send the encrypted co-
occurrence matrices to PPRS. After that, the PPRS generates the initial item-item co-
occurrence matrix by adding all the encrypted co-occurrence matrices from the initial users. 
 I1 I2 I3 I4 
I1 e(3) e(2) e(1) e(1) 
I2 e(2) e(3) e(3) e(1) 
I3 e(1) e(3) e(1) e(2) 
I4 e(1) e(1) e(2) e(3) 
 
    Fig.7 Co-occurrence matrix of POI 
 U1 U2 U3 U4 
I1 e(1) e(0) e(0) e(0) 
I2 e(1) e(1) e(1) e(0) 
I3 e(0) e(1) e(0) e(1) 
I4 e(0) e(0) e(0) e(0) 
 
    Fig.8 User Behavior History Matrix 
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Algorithm : Initialization  
Input: User-Item tuple set UI = {(𝑢, 𝑖)|𝑢 ∈ U, 𝑖 ∈ I}, User set U, Item INDEX set I  
// User-Item tuple (u,i) represents user u has visited POI i. 
Output: Co-occurrence Matrix CM  
// CM represents how many users visited the same pair of POSs. 
 
function AggregateCoMatrix (a set of CMu)  
// Executed at PPRS with FHE 
//calculate # of co-rated(overlapping) users between items 
1. Assign CM[1..|I|][1..|I|] = 0 //co-occurrence matrix 
2. foreach user u in U 
3.   for i=1 to |I| 
4.         for j=1 to |I| 
5.                 CM[i][j]+= CMu [i][j]  
6.          endfor 
7.      endfor 
8. endforeach 
9. return CM 
 
function CoMatrix (UI,u,I)  
// Executed at each user u without FHE 
//calculate # of co-rated(overlapping) users between items 
1. Assign CMu[1..|I|][1..|I|] = 0 // co-occurrence matrix for user u 
2.     for i=1 to |I|-1 
3.         if  ( (u, i)	∈ 𝑈𝐼	) CMu [i][i] +=1 endif 
4.         for j=i+1 to |I| 
5.             if  ( (u, i)	∈ 𝑈𝐼 and  (u, j)	∈ 𝑈𝐼 and  i≠j ) 
6.                 CMu [i][j]+=1,  CMu [j][i]+=1  
7.             endif 
8.          endfor 
9.      endfor 
10. encrypt  CMu with pk 
1. return CMu 
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4.2.2 Selection Phrase 
 
             
     Because the original co-occurrence matrix is large and only a small block corresponding to 
a user’s location is needed for computation, the main task of the selection phase is to scale 
down the co-occurrence matrix secretly. Here, each POI is mapped to one index of the co-
occurrence matrix; however, one index may include several POIs, where an index represents a 
small area, as shown in Fig.9. 
Assume user u is in block Bu which is defined as: Bu= {O𝑏B, . . , 𝑏(R|𝑏B, 𝑏( ∈ I, i ≤ j	}, where 
I represents for the item INDEX set. 
User u generates two selection matrixes according to the block Bu. One is for selecting block 
Bu from co-occurrence matrix denoted as SMCO. The other is for selecting block Bu from user 
history behavior matrix denoted as SMUB.  
 
                               SMCO[i][j] = V	e(1)	, 𝑖𝑓	𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥	𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛	𝑏B	𝑡𝑜	𝑏(Î	𝐵b					e(0)	, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒						                       
 
                     
                               SMUB[i] = V							e(1)	, 𝑖𝑓	𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥	𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛	𝑏B	𝑡𝑜	𝑏(Î	𝐵b								
e(0)	, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒			                      
 
Fig.9 An example of Selection Phrase 
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   Next, Enc(SMCO) and Enc(SMUB) will be sent to the PPRS. Co-occurrence Matrix will be 
multiplied by Enc(SMCO) while User History Behavior Matrix will be multiplied by 
Enc(SMUB).     
      An example of selecting block 1 is shown in Fig.9 and Fig.10: 
In Fig.9, a map is divided into 2 blocks (b1, b2). The user is in cell number 8, which belongs 
to block 1. Thus, the user generates the encrypted selection matrix shown in Fig.10 (b) and 
sends it to the PPRS.  After the multiplication of these two encrypted matrixes Fig10(a)(b), 
block 1 can be secretly retrieved.  
                          
Algorithm : Generate Selection Matrix 
Input: Co-occurrence Matrix CM, target user’s selected Block Bu= {O𝑏B, . . , 𝑏(R|𝑏B, 𝑏( ∈I, i < j, I: item	INDEX	set}  
// the size of CM is |I|*|I|  
Output: Selection Matrix SMCO and  SMUB  
// SMCO is the selection matrix for retrieving  Bu from co-occurrence matrix CM 
// SMUB is the selection matrix for retrieving Bu from the user’s behavior  history matrix 
BMu 
function GenSelectionMatrix (CM,Bu,I)  
11. Assign  SMCO[1..|I|][1..|I|] = 0  
12. for i=1 to |I|  
13.      for j=1 to |I|  
14.         if 	(𝑖Î	𝐵b	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑗Î	𝐵b) 
15.             SMCO[i][j]=e(1)	 
16.         else   
17.             SMCO[i][j]=e(0) 
18.         endif 
19.      endfor 
20. endfor 
21. Assign  SMUB [1..|I|]= 0 
22. for i=1 to |I|  
23.       if  	(𝑖Î	𝐵b) 
24.            SMUB [i]=e(1)	 
25.       else  
26.            SMUB [i]=e(0) 
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4.2.3 Recommendation Phase 
 In the previous selection phase, the selected matrix MSCO from the co-occurrence matrix 
and MSUB from the user history behavior matrix are generated. After multiplication and 
addition of MSCO and MSUB, the primary stage of recommendation result will be generated. 
      In Section 2.4, we mentioned that the similarity between items i and j is defined as below:  
 
                                          𝑠𝑖𝑚(𝑖, 𝑗) = |=(>)∩=(@)|=(>)    
The primary stage of recommendation computation just gets the result of  |𝑁(B) ∩ 𝑁(()| 
homomorphically instead of  
|=(>)∩=(@)|=(>)   because HElib applied cannot directly support 
division or floats at the present time. In addition, the sorting calculation of the recommendation 
result over encrypted data has technical difficulties and incurs overhead computation cost.  
Therefore, in our proposed the method, the PSP, which holds the privacy key, will 
implement the final stage of recommendation and sorting calculation after decrypting the 
primary recommendation result by the private key. 
          
                       Fig.10 An example of generating the recommendation result 
 
 
 
27.       endif 
28. endfor 
29. return  SMCO, SMUB 
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4.2.4 Encrypted Database Update 
    Updating the ED is also one of the novel parts of the proposed protocol. In the proposed 
model (Fig.5), steps 4–6 (4. Choose the interested POI, 5. Enc(check-in item), 6. Update the 
database) show how the updating part works. The user chooses the desired POI p from the 
recommendation lists and generates the co-occurrence matrix p combining with the user’s own 
behavior history saved in the user’s endpoint (step 4), encrypt this co-occurrence matrix and 
send it back to the PPRS (step 5). The PPRS processes the updating calculation between the 
ciphertexts from the user and the encrypted data in the database. 
    An example of updating the ED is shown as below: 
     
 
 
Algorithm : Generate The Primary Recommendation Result 
Input:  Co-occurrence Matrix CM’, User Behavior History Matrix  BM’u, Item INDEX 
set I  
Output: Recommendation Result Array Re  
// Re[j] represents item j’s primary recommendation score without dividing N(i) after 
adopting item-based collaborative filtering with the target user’s behavior history  BM’u 
function Recommend (CM’, BM’u, I) 
1. Assign  Re[1..|I|] = 0  
2. for j=1 to |I| 
3.     for i=1 to |I| 
4.         Re[j]+=CM’[j][i]* BM’u [j] 
5.     endfor 
6. endfor 
7. return Re 
Fig.11 An example of updating encrypted database 
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5. Experimental Evaluation 
 5.1 Experimental Environment 
     We implemented our proposed protocol with the dataset in C++. As for the encryption part, 
we used HElib, which is based on BGV full homomorphic scheme.  
      The experiments were executed on two machines. The client side had configurations of 64-
bit CentOS 6, Intel Xeon E7-8880 v3 @ 2.30 GHz x 72, and 1 TB memory, the server side had 
configurations of 64-bit CentOS 6.7, Intel Xeon CPU E5-2643 v3 @ 3.40 GHz and 512 GB 
RAM. 10-Gbps Ethernet connected these two machines. 
5.2 Dataset 
In this work, we only consider sensitive POIs such as hospital, clinic, church, and LGBT 
bar. Fig. 12 includes the survey result of Medical Institution Information of Tokyo from Japan 
Medical Analysis Platform. Moreover, according to Agency for Cultural Affairs, and GClick, 
which is a LGBT bar guide in Japan, the number of LGBT bars and churches in Tokyo are 637 
and 833, respectively. As we can see, the number of sensitive POIs (medical institution) in 
Fig.12 The data of medical institution Information in Tokyo 
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each ward of Tokyo is between 500 and 1300. The number of LGBT bars or churches in the 
entire Tokyo area is not more than 1000.  
Therefore, we used an artificial dataset with dimension N ranging in 
{5,10,20,40,80,100,1000}. In this situation, which ward of Tokyo the user is located in can be 
protected from the PPRS.   
 
5.3 Experiment Results and Evaluation 
                                                                                        
                                              TABLE 2 THE PARAMETER OF HELIB 
 
 
 
 
     The experiments consist of two parts: the selection phrase and recommendation phrase, both 
of which need real-time computing. As for the ED update part, since it can be finished offline 
regularly, the efficiency does not have a significant impact on user experience. Table 2 lists the 
parameters of the HElib used in this experiment. Table 2 lists the parameters of the HElib. 
 
Selection phrase: 
     In the selection phrase, the item-based co-occurrence matrix CM and user’s behavior history 
matrix BMu is element-wisely multiplied by each selection matrix.  Here, the SV packing 
technique is adopted to reduce the number of ciphertexts which converts a vector of integers 
to one ciphertext. Thus, multiplication by N times is executed in the selection phrase, where N 
is the size of the co-occurrence matrix CM. Table 3 shows the exeution time of selection phase. 
Recommendation phrase: 
     In the recommendation phrase, the multiplication between CM’ and BM’u is executed. 
Table 4 shows the execution time of recommendation phrase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M L #slot security Plaintext 
Space 
16384 10 4096 132 81913 
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                TABLE 3 THE EXECUTION TIME OF SELECTION PHASE 
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TABLE 4  THE EXECUTION TIME OF RECOMMENDATION PHASE 
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5.4 Communication Cost 
 Since the slot size l is 4096 and size of the co-occurrence matrix of the POI is N, the user 
will send two encrypted selection matrices (one is to select the user-based co-occurrence matrix 
and the other is to select user behavior history matrix) to the server, and the communication 
cost is O(Nl). 
 
                               TABLE 5 THE EXPERIMENT RESULT OF COMMUNICATION SIZE                        
                
5.5 Memory Cost 
    In table 6, we listed both virtual memory usage and resident memory usage of both the 
selection phrase and the recommendation phase.  
 
                             TABLE 6  THE EXPERIMENT RESULT OF MEMORY SIZE 
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5.6 Security Proof 
 In the proposed model, PSP (Privacy Service Provider) is trusted and PPRS (Privacy-
Preserving Recommendation LBS Server) is honest-but-curious. Only the PSP holds the 
private keys which means no one can decrypt the message except PSP. After the PSP 
decrypting the recommendation result from the PPRS, the result in plaintext will be sent to the 
user by Secure Channel. In addition, the database is also encrypted. Thus, the malicious users 
are not able to learn any information even though database were leak. 
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6.Conclusion 
      In this paper, we proposed the protocol of privacy-preserving recommendation on the 
location-based service by combining three main techniques. They are Hilbert curve, 
collaborative filtering recommender based on the co-occurrence matrix and FHE. Compared 
with the previous protocol, which concentrated only on privacy-preserving k-NN search, the 
novelty of our proposed protocol is that the protocol can benefit both service users and service 
providers, which means it has commercial value and can be applied practically. It not only 
protects users’ information from being disclosed to malicious parties, but also provides the 
newest recommendation result by the database which can be updated. 
       The preliminary evaluation showed that the process of our proposed privacy-preserving 
recommendation for LBS with  1,000 POIs requires 304.6 seconds. It is still long for the use 
of commercial recommendation services so that further speedup, larger scalability, and higher 
efficiency are our future work. Besides, in this implementation, a naïve recommendation was 
adopted and only the item-based collaborative filtering within the same block, i.e., 
geographical area, is considered. However, we may extend our scheme to item-based 
collaborative filtering by using whole POIs relationship to have more accurate 
recommendation result. 
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